Abstract: This paper surveys the risks brought by multitenancy in software platforms, along with the most prominent solutions proposed to address them. A multitenant platform hosts and executes software from several users (tenants). The platform must ensure that no malicious or faulty code from any tenant can interfere with the normal execution of other users' code or with the platform itself. This security requirement is specially relevant in Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds. PaaS clouds oer an execution environment based on some software platform. Unless PaaS systems are deemed as safe environments users will be reluctant to trust them to run any relevant application. This requires to take into account how multitenancy is handled by the software platform used as the basis of the PaaS oer. This survey focuses on two technologies that are or will be the platform-of-choice in many PaaS clouds: Java and .NET. We describe the security mechanisms 
Introduction
The term multitenancy refers to the ability of a platform to run software from dierent users in a safe manner. To some degree, multitenancy is supported in many software platforms such as OSs or Virtual Platforms (VPs) such as Java and .NET. However, as this survey shows, none of these platforms oer a fully secured hosting environment. This problem is relevant even in controlled environments where only code from trusted users will be run: faulty code can stall its container for example by allocating too many objects (so the system runs out of memory). Security concerns are even more pressing if code from unknown users is hosted.
This work depicts how malicious code can interfere with the container platform that executes it, or with other software also hosted in the same container.
Also, it presents the research works that try to solve the security limitations of standard platforms regarding multitenancy. As we will see this problem has not been neglected by the research community, but arguably it has not received as much attention as other security-related problems so far (e.g. Web attacks such as denial of service, cross-site scripting or SQL injections have been deeply studied). This is likely to change due to the growing importance of cloud systems [53] where multitenancy is specially relevant.
Cloud systems allow organizations to outsource the operation of IT infrastructure, both hardware and software. Much attention has been payed to them due to the potential benets and business opportunities that clouds could bring [18] . However, there are several concerns that could impede the adoption Inria hal-00657306, version 1 -6 Jan 2012
of cloud-based solutions [40] . Some of them are uncertain reliability (low availability and/or performance dropouts), vulnerability to network attacks (e.g.
Denial of Service attacks), or potential vendor lock-in (users not being able to migrate their software to other clouds). Those are not addressed here as they are outside the scope of this work. Another relevant factor to be considered by potential cloud users is security: if clouds are perceived as risky environments users will be very reluctant to migrate their systems there [55] . Unfortunately, securing clouds is not a trivial task as they must face several threats. This survey focuses on the risks induced by multitenancy in Platform-as-a-Service 1 , which runs Java servlets. In a PaaS cloud components from dierent users can be run in the same platform or container system. As we will see, this
implies that malicious users have several straightforward ways to interfere with the normal execution of other components or with the container itself. This is emphasized in [52] , where the authors specify that providers are responsible for isolating components so that no user software can interfere with other users.
This paper further explores this requirement by surveying the isolation capabilities of potential PaaS platforms. This analysis is due at three levels representing three possible container systems: Operating System (OS) level, Virtual Platform (VP) level (i.e. Java and .NET) and container level. Most emphasis is put on the VP and container levels as, as we will see, these are more relevant for PaaS clouds.
To avoid confusion, we should clarify that there are some systems also denoted PaaS clouds that build a unique environment per user which is hosted in not shared machines, e.g. provided by an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud. This is the case for example of Stax.net 2 that oers pre-packaged disk images with the software stack that the user demands and where the deployment and monitoring process is eased thanks to the custom tools provided. Fig. 1(a) shows an example of such layout, where the PaaS system deploys each user's components in dierent Virtual Machines. In these systems it is the provider of the VMs (an IaaS provider) who is in charge of implementing proper isolation (which has its own challenges, see [48] ). Hence, this paper does not deal with such PaaS systems as they delegate the implementation of secure isolation to the VM level.
In this paper we focus instead on PaaS clouds that host and run applications from several dierent users in the same platform [57] in a safe manner.
Tenants share PaaS platform resources (hardware, libraries, supporting services, IT management, etc.), but this is totally transparent to them. This way, the provider can host more users' applications in the same resources. Fig. 1(b) depicts such a PaaS system, where components from dierent users are deployed in the same container systems. To achieve safe multitenancy in PaaS platform each application must run isolated from the rest, so a malicious or faulty application cannot impact others. Also, as the code executed by the PaaS system may be untrusted, it is necessary to nd mechanisms that can enforce security policies to decrease the risks involved in running such code.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explore security 1 http://code.google.com/appengine 2 http://stax.net
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hal-00657306, version 1 -6 Jan 2012 to signal VPs such as Java as more adequate to build PaaS systems. The most well-known container systems are based on Java, so emphasis is put on this platform. Thus, Section 3 focuses on studying standard Java features and its limitations as a PaaS container platform from the point of view of security, while Section 4 discusses security on Java container systems. Data encryption for data in transit or stored in the lesystem; 4) Prevention of execution of memory zones, using the No execute (Nx) page ag; 5) Isolation is nally the last (but not least) security area OSs must provide. Process isolation has been a basic feature of most OSs for decades. Proper isolation prevents any process to interfere with others or to access protected resources. This is achieved through well known protection mechanisms (memory segmentation and page mapping) that build a separated address space for each process. A process cannot access memory regions outside its address space. Although other ways to implement process isolation have been proposed [2] , this is by far the most common in modern OSs. [39] shows how to take benet of virtual machines to secure an OS. Also, [13] propose a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) based system to ensure integrity in OS and VMs.
Other menaces are present, but they are not so related with multitenancy (which is the main focus of this paper) or are already dealt with by the areas depicted above. This same idea of`container' is present in many systems, however they are implemented at the application level (where any resource management and tenant isolation task must be implemented).
3 Security and Multitenancy in the Java Platform Arguably, the best well-known container systems are based on the Java platform.
The Enterprise Java Bean [35] (EJB) and Servlets [34] specications (part of the J2EE specication [36] ), and the OSGi 3 specication [43] are the most relevant Java container technologies and they can be expected to have a prominent role in future PaaS platforms. For example, the GAE PaaS system already provides a runtime engine for Java servlets.
Standard Security Capabilities of Java
This section presents a brief summary of the main security features of the standard Java platform (for more information on this topic see [42, 60] ). The Java specication includes the Java security model 4 , a set of features that intend to make Java a safe environment. They include: sandbox execution so potential risks for the hosting system are limited; bytecode verication so the runtime is not corrupted; and cryptography, PKI, and secure transport APIs for communications protection. Also, Java implements a class loading mechanism that can 3 The term OSGi was originally the acronym of Open Services Gateway initiative, but today that name is obsolete. in cloud platforms untrusted code will be run by special threads with specic class loaders that limit which classes can be accessed.
Furthermore, Java implements strong access control capabilities to limit access to resources such as network, les, system properties, or any logical entity that the container must protect. The class loader sets for each class the protection domain it belongs to. This domain carries 1) a set of permissions ; 2) the code source, an entity that contains the public certicates used to sign the code (if any). The security policy, which is set when the platform starts, is used to determine which permissions can be assigned to each class depending on its code source. Finally, the security manager is the entity that enforces security. Previous control is code-centric, but can also be user-centric by using the standard Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) APIs. Once a user is authenticated through JAAS, one or more principals are associated to her. The security policy used determines which permissions are assigned to each principal when running a certain code. A more complex authorization solution (both role-based and hierarchical) oriented to multitenant clouds is presented in [10] .
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Security Hazards in Java
Unfortunately, the Java platform also presents certain limitations that hinder the construction of secure multitenant environments. In [27] and [6] the authors analyze the problems and threats to be taken into account when using Java as a multitenant platform. In [27] the authors also study the problems derived from running multitenant software as Java threads. As they explained, even if newer Java versions include protection mechanisms [60] so that no thread could neither modify nor stop other threads, still many issues remain:
Isolation. A proper isolation mechanism must ensure that one tenant cannot access to components of other tenants. Figure 3 shows three dierent isolation solutions that PaaS platforms can use, ranging from isolating applications by running them on their own OS process, going through using already available security devices such as class loaders, or using last advances on virtual platforms to provide full applications isolation in the same container.
(a) Isolation at OS Level Later on, an evolution of the MVM was developed so the same MVM could support applications of dierent users at OS level [14] . This is implemented by controlling access to private les, allowing the safe execution of native code and adding a mechanism to ensure the correct operation of core native libraries by replicating the global state of shared core classes.
Note that this work refers to users at OS level, not to be confused with the tenants of PaaS systems that will try to run their code in the VP. In a PaaS environment, it is safe to assume that the platform will always be started by a single OS level user (admin).
These and other works inuenced the Java Specication Request
(JSR)
5 Java Specication Requests are the standard process to dene and propose new additions to the Java platform.
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121 Java Isolation API [33] , which enables Java applications to start other applications in an isolated manner. This specication denes a set of interfaces for the creation and control of isolated containers for components.
However, it does not impose any implementation strategy so each isolated component could be implemented by a whole JVM running on an OS process of its own, or all isolations could share the same JVM (as in the case of MVM).
On the other hand, the JSR 121 has not been included yet in any standard release of the Java platform, and in fact it seems to be a dormant specication. Also, research project Barcelona 6 , that hosted the development of the MVM, is no longer active 7 .
KaeOS is another interesting proposal developed by Back and Hsieh [3] .
KaeOS is a new JVM that implements support for isolated processes inside the runtime and manages the CPU and memory resources available to each process. These processes are similar to the ones given by typical OSs. They claim that they provide better isolation capacities that the isolates given by the MVM.
Georay et al. [22, 24] also apply the concept of isolates originated by the work on MVMs. However, they transform them so that they are not associated to a running task (i.e. threads can migrate among domains in contrast to isolates) but to class loaders (classes loaded by the same class loader are in the same isolation). With this approach they avoid the overhead caused by inter-task communication in the MVM. As in the case of MVM, each isolate keeps its own copy of static variables and instances of Class. In [24] the authors introduce I-JVM, a modied JVM that implements their concept of isolates. I-JVM is based on VMKit [23] , a software framework to speed up the creation of VPs.
Finally, Sun et al. [51] focus on solving the problems originated by the sharing of the heap memory, such as memory leaks from faulty software that can consume all available memory. The heap is split in logical partitions, so the memory faults caused by a component only aect the partition it resides in. The partition can be repaired without rebooting the whole system.
Resource Accounting. As commented before, the security manager and protection domains are the foundation of the Java environment to implement and assign custom security policies that control access to resources by code (depending, for example, on the origin of that code). Unfortunately, once access is granted to some code, that code can use the resource without limitations. There is no accounting of resource usage by threads in the Java platform, and, so, there is no way to enforce a limited utilization of resources. Therefore, a malevolent tenant can, for example, try to exhaust all available memory just by creating many instances of objects.
The (somewhat old) Java Virtual Machine Proling Interface 8 (JVMPI) and its more recent replacement the Java Virtual Machine Tooling Interface 9 (JVMTI) can be used to support resource accounting as they allow to inspect the state of applications and the JVM. However, these interfaces must be used by software written in native code, breaking Java portability. Also, they introduce a considerable overhead that can make them unusable in many production environments. Finally, these interfaces do not aim at accounting of generic resources.
There have been several approaches trying to solve this for dierent single resources. For example [47] proposes a system able to account memory usage by using a modied garbage collector that computes the total size of objects reachable by each task as it looks for unreachable objects. They are deemed to be imprecise due to shared references [3] .
Other works apply bytecode rewriting (also called program transformations) to inject some kind of accounting capabilities to the Java platform in a portable way. This manner, the platform should be able to prevent threads from using too many resources. The most prominent eorts using this approach are JRes [16] and JRAF-2 [8, 9, 28, 7] .
As a result of this concern about the lack of a proper resource control mechanism in Java, Czajkowski and others started to work in a new Resource Management (RM) API [17] . This work and the MVM [15] (discussed above) are strongly related. The RM uses MVM's idea of isolates as the basic accounting entity that can demand or dispense resources, and [17] introduces an implementation of the RM API on top of the MVM.
Eventually [17] leaded to the creation of the JSR 284 Resource Consumption Management API [37] . This JSR, which has been recently approved, denes a set of interfaces that enable the programming of resource management policies. This API will be a framework through which resources can be uniformly exposed to client programs as entities subject to management . Also, JSR 284 includes a set of core resources that all compliant implementations will have to expose by default. An implementation is already available, but it is unknown if this API will be included in future releases of any of the avors (J2ME, J2SE, J2EE) of the standard Java platform.
On the other hand, KaeOS implements per process resource accounting and bounds setting (CPU and memory). It does not provide accounting of other resources neither from the platform nor handled by the users. Safe Thread Termination. This problem is due to the lack of a safe way to enforce the termination of a Java thread. The java.lang.Thread.stop() method was intended for that, but:
It is deprecated because it is deemed unsafe: the terminated thread would release all its monitors, which could leave some objects in an inconsistent state.
9 http://java.sun.com/javase/6/docs/technotes/guides/jvmti RR n°7838
The method triggers a java.lang.ThreadDeath exception in the thread to stop it. The thread can just catch that exception and ignore it to keep running.
Hence malicious threads can remain alive forever, consuming resources trying to monopolize resources, block other threads, etc. Another problem could be caused by the platform trying to run a safe shutdown, which implies that all threads running inside the platform must be stopped rst.
If the platform waits for a malicious thread to terminate then it could be brought to a stall state. Some solutions [49] propose to modify the untrusted software bytecode to inject termination checks at certain execution points. These solutions have a drawback: they incur heavy performance penalties.
MVM does solve this problem. A MVM-aware application can create, execute, pause, resume and stop other applications. Also, KaeOS allows to stop the processes it is based on.
Finally, in I-JVM, when one isolate is terminated all the threads originated by it are stopped by a special StoppedIsolateException exception that can only be caught by objects outside the terminated isolate (so the exception cannot be ignored by the isolate being stopped).
But I-JVM, on the other hand, does not totally implement safe thread termination. The problem is that in I-JVM the same thread can traverse dierent domains regardless its origin (this cannot happen in MVM nor in KaeOS) as isolations are not based on threads unlike MVM isolates or KaeOS processes. When one thread is stopped all the monitors locked by it are released, which could leave objects synchronized by those locks in an inconsistent state. In I-JVM this could happen when releasing the locks of objects in isolates other than the one being stopped. This is the same reason because the standard java.Thread.stop() method was deprecated in Java. The creators of I-JVM estimate that the benets of light inter-isolation communication outweigh this problem. 4 Security in Java Application Containers
It is to be expected that future PaaS clouds will not run user components right on top of the JVM. It seems more likely they will use container technologies to provide added standard services. In [26] , the authors identify the security threats that multitenant containers must address and enumerate the security requirements they must fulll:
Availability : an application shall not use local or connected resources that prevent other applications from running due to resource starvation. The container should have mechanisms to enforce dierent resource sharing policies. Also, the container must be available regardless of the state of the applications running inside.
Condentiality and Integrity : an application shall not explore or modify the platform of other applications if not authorized. Access to other applications and their data must be controlled.
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It is straightforward to see that these requirements would be achieved by properly addressing the issues listed in Section 3. Container availability can be brought by safe thread termination and resource accounting, while condentiality and integrity would be implemented by full isolation of components.
The remainder of this section focuses on the security features of J2EE and
OSGi technologies, as they are the most prominent relevant Java container solutions today. Also, the works that try to bring stronger security capabilities to each container technology are listed.
J2EE Containers
The EJB specication [35] , as part of the contract between the EJB and the container, imposes strong restrictions and limitations to what EJBs can do.
EJBs cannot create threads (to avoid interferences with the container's ability to control components' lifecycle), manipulate les (les are not transactional resources and could also limit the application distributability), modify class loaders, access non nal static elds (such elds would make a bean dicult to distribute), etc.
These restrictions are enforced by the EJB container through the standard Java security model (see Section 3.1), and all together build an interesting security mechanism. EJB containers combine these constraints with the application of class loaders to achieve proper EJBs isolation. Unfortunately, these restrictions impose a somewhat limited programming model which may not be appropriate for many development needs. And, more important, they are not enough to fully achieve the requirements listed in Section 3.2.
On the other hand, the Servlet specication, which is also part of the J2EE platform (as the EJB specication), does not stress isolation among servlets, nor imposes strict restrictions for servlet programming. In this specication, security is concerned only with authentication and authorization of servlets' clients.
It is possible, of course, to apply the standard security Java mechanisms (such as access control and PKI APIs) to the development of servlets and EJBs based systems. There are texts available that address this topic [61, 62] Some research works [32, 31] have tried to use MVM (see Section 3.2) to achieve proper isolation among users applications on J2EE environments. In [32] the authors discuss how to apply MVM's isolates in a J2EE server. They propose using application domain isolates, where one application domain encapsulates one or more user J2EE applications, including its required servers. Later on, in [31] the authors used a MVM extended with the Resource Management API (dened in [17] , see Section 3.2) and combine it with application domain isolates, so they can easily monitor the resources used by each application.
A Servlets-Based PaaS: Google App Engine
Being a prominent PaaS platform, based totally in the Java Virtual Platform, it is worth to discuss how GAE has addressed the security problems of standard Java.
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hal-00657306, version 1 -6 Jan 2012 First, they limit the possible actions that users can perform applying the Java security model, i.e. they apply custom class loaders and security policies enforced by the Security Manager. For example, tenants cannot create new threads, instantiate certain classes, modify system properties or read les that do not belong to the user application (a GAE application is basically a set of Java servlets, Javascript code, conguration les and static content like images or HTML pages).
Regarding isolation, GAE solves it in a quite naive manner: users do not share servers. Each user application runs on its own JVM instance (as depicted in Fig. 3(a) ).
GAE oers accounting data of certain resources: CPU, network bandwidth and stored data size. Users are billed depending on the amount of resources used. However, it is not explained how GAE performs this accounting (using a custom JVM, using the JVM Tooling Interface, at OS level, etc.).
Finally, GAE uses thread termination to control how long it takes to attend each request. A request in GAE can last up to 30 seconds. When that limit expires, an exception is thrown by the platform to the servlet processing the request. If the exception is not caught, the thread will nish and a HTTP 500 server error message will be sent in response to the HTTP request that triggered the thread execution. If the exception is caught the runtime engine will give the request handler a little bit more time (less than a second) after raising the exception to prepare a custom response . After that, the thread is terminated by force. Google claims that the thread is shutdown gracefully, other threads in the same server are not aected. In fact, the whole container is stopped. To make sure that other threads are not aected, the load balancer in front of the container stops sending requests to it when a thread is to be stopped. Then, when no more threads are running, the whole container server can be stopped. This implies that programmers should develop servlets taking into account that requests should be attended by stateless processes (there is no concept of session anity per user) as consecutive requests from the same user can be forwarded to dierent server instances.
OSGi Containers
The OSGi framework denes a platform where loosely coupled software mod- 
Inria
hal-00657306, version 1 -6 Jan 2012
Some works try to improve the OSGi framework robustness by providing better isolation: Gama and Donsez [21] patch an OSGi implementation using the Isolation API (JSR 121) on MVM to provide service level isolation.
In [24] the authors modify an OSGi implementation to run with I-JVM. They show how applying I-JVM this new OSGi platform solves the 8 risks described in [45] tied to the JVM.
Other works try to enhance the tolerance to faulty software, for example in [1] the authors use light proxies to route calls between bundles that wrap service objects and handle failures when they occur.
Security Considerations about the .NET Platform as a PaaS Enabler Technology
No any other VP has been as intensively studied as the Java platform. Also, no other VP has reached the same popularity. But Java is not the only candidate VP that can be used to build a PaaS system. This section will introduce the main security features of the .NET platform, which can be regarded as an alternative to the Java platform.
Standard Security Capabilities of .NET
The .NET platform is a development environment created by Microsoft with several similarities with the Java platform. The Common Language Runtime (CLR), which would be the equivalent to the JVM in .NET settings, implements the main security aspects of this platform.
In .NET, software is contained in libraries denoted assemblies, which are grouped in code groups. Membership of code groups is ruled by the evidences that each assembly carries (for example who signs the code). Each code group has an associated set of permissions. If some assembly belongs to more than one group, its associated permissions are the union of all the permissions of all groups it belongs to.
The mapping between code groups and permissions is done through security policies. Policies are organized in a hierarchy with 4 levels (top-down order):
enterprise, machine, user and application domain. Usually, the permission associated to each code group is given by the intersection of the permissions at all levels it belongs to, although more complex settings are possible.
Permissions are used for granting access to resources or to other code. They have a stack walking semantics very similar to the one found in Java. If a method demands a certain permission, then all the methods higher than the current one in the call stack are checked for that permission. This prevents attacks in which some untrusted software tries to use a trusted piece of code to run a protected operation.
We can see that the CLR access control mechanism has similarities with the one used in Java, although it is considered by some [46] as easier to use.
Security Hazards in .NET
Isolation. The CLR implements the concept of Application Domains instances use the same code, the CLR will handle one copy of that code per AD where it is used. For intra-process isolation in .NET, using dierent application domains is recommended because they can be dynamically loaded and unloaded during the runtime of the application.
An interesting feature of the CLR is that it keeps a separate copy of the static variables maintained for each domain, thus preventing object references from being leaked across domains as static variables. We can conclude that, by default, the CLR has more complete (and thus safer) isolation capabilities than the standard JVM. However, although the application domain concept provides a straightforward way to achieve tenancy isolation, the fact is that CLR still suers some other limitations of the Java platform.
Resource Accounting Just like in the case of Java, .NET does not implement any generic resource accounting functionality. It does have a proling mechanism, but it provides information about the state of the CLR through events (load/unload of classes, threads creation, and others),
it cannot be used by components developers to control the resources they oer.
There has been some works around resource accounting that target Windows applications. Notably [44] have described a framework that allows resource accounting. This framework allows the dynamic assignment of resources to tasks and task management to a ne granularity that includes bounding the running context of tasks (for example in CPU and memory usage) therefore creating a sandboxed context for the task. The framework described here targets unmanaged code (code that does not target the .NET framework and is not run by the CLR) but the authors stated it was being extended to allow .NET remote resources to be used. 
.
The compliance and possible implementation of an OSGi-like platform on the .NET framework has been studied by [20] . To enforce OSGi-like containers in .NET, the authors recommend applying ADs. They can provide the necessary isolation mechanisms, yet the only way to communicate between two non-shared application domains is by using interprocess communication solutions such as .NET remoting. These communication mechanisms come with a considerable time overhead which would make some applications impractical, yet the possibility of an OSGi-like platform implemented on top of the .NET framework exists.
There have been a few projects that aim towards the development of a PaaS cloud based on the .NET framework. One such project is the Aneka Cloud Platform described in [54] . The goal of the Aneka project is to provide a PaaS cloud that enables the deployment of public, private or hybrid clouds.
The Aneka platform is based on Aneka containers. They provide the services required for platform management and the runtime necessary for the execution of applications.
Security inside the Aneka platform is handled by providers of authentication and authorization. The providers have the role of abstracting the concrete mechanisms that perform the task. As such, Aneka is able to use the underlying authentication and authorization mechanisms of the environment in which it was deployed if required and also to provide custom ones.
Although the general mechanisms used for application isolation in current cloud environments have been presented, the specics implemented in Aneka related to this domain have not been detailed in the referenced work. As a result, the reader is unsure if Aneka contains implicit isolation or sandboxing for its deployed applications or if the Aneka user is responsible for developing her/his own isolation mechanisms.
In a previous work [12] Aneka has been described as an enterprise grid platform. In addition to the membership-based security approach described above, On the other hand, although Schneider's denition of EM does not include any mechanism that modies the executed code, such solutions are also considered by other authors as EM. Schneider himself states that nothing prevents using such approach with arbitrary security automata [50] .
Security monitors that modify the untrusted code are denoted Inline Reference Monitors (IRM) . Some examples of IRM based solutions are SASI [59] , it adds code that 1) simulates an automaton that enforces a certain security policy and 2) it is executed before each untrusted code instruction.
Java-MaC [38] , an implementation in Java of the Monitoring and Checking architecture, which ensures that the code runs correctly with regards to a formal specication of requirements.
Polymer [5] , it allows to dene monitors in the Polymer language and translates them to Java bytecode, which is then used to rewrite the untrusted code.
The idea of weaving security enforcement code inside untrusted modules is clearly related with Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP). AOP [19] intends to provide mechanisms to dene crosscutting concerns, or aspects, that are present in dierent components of the same system. Security is one of such concerns, as many components (if not all) must take into account security policies and constraints.
Through AOP a PaaS platform could reinforce security rules in a transparent manner [56] , like for example log relevant data, implement protection Inria hal-00657306, version 1 -6 Jan 2012
techniques against buer overows, etc. The Polymer system is in fact using an approach similar to AOP. Java-MOP [11] also applies AOP to monitor formal specications in programs. In a recent work [25] the authors present an XML-based language to express security rules as automata whose edge labels (i.e. transitions) become AOP pointcuts, that is, places in the code aected by a certain aspect and where the IRMs will be injected. A more straightforward application of AOP to security is found in [58] . Here the authors apply AOP to add role-based access control to a CORBA access control system. Also, users could apply AOP to point out in which parts of the service some security policies must be checked.
Rather than injecting extra code to untrusted applications, other solutions are oriented to the static analysis of software before execution to ensure that it does not break any security police. For example, Proof Carrying Code [41] (PCC) carries static information that can be examined before execution to prove that the code is safe. It is unlikely however that in PaaS systems such extra information will be available. As cloud adoption grows, also there will be an increasing demand for multitenant platforms that allow to run, in a safe manner, untrusted code from dierent users in the same container system.
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hal-00657306, version 1 -6 Jan 2012 But present standard VPs, that could be used as the basic building blocks of PaaS clouds, still suer from some important security aws that must be taken into account when designing a PaaS system. Figure 4 summarizes the main open security issues at each level of a Java PaaS platform. Also, for each level the gure briey enumerates both the solutions presented in this survey to address those issues, along with the security mechanisms already implemented. The CLR on the other hand implements more powerful isolation characteristics that solve some of the problems present in Java. However it seems that Java is better positioned as a base platform for building PaaS clouds. First, the CLR still lacks a safe mechanism for thread termination and a generic resource accounting framework (which is addressed in Java by JSR 284). Also, remarkable container technologies are based on the Java platform (J2EE and OSGi) and it is reasonable to expect them to be the basis of several PaaS platforms (as they are already). Furthermore, much research eort has been put on the JVM to address its security limitations (MVM, KaeOS, I-JVM). Of all these works, MVM seems the more complete solution as it answers all open security issues.
I-JVM, on the other hand, takes a dierent approach to isolation, so they allow threads to traverse dierent isolates. This way they solve the high costs of interisolate communication present in MVM and KaeOS. However, due precisely to its design, I-JVM does not solve the thread termination issue. Designers of secure PaaS systems should decide which approach better suits their needs.
Besides the security guarantees achieved by the platform, security in PaaS clouds must address other aspects. First they must try to enforce security poliInria hal-00657306, version 1 -6 Jan 2012
cies so users do not build applications that are themselves prone to attack. This can be done through the enforcement of security policies by the code monitoring techniques studied above. A survey of research in this area shows that most proposals are based on AOP in the Java platform, which further positions Java as a good candidate to build secure PaaS clouds.
In any case, future work on VPs and container systems (which will impact on the security of PaaS clouds) should take into account the risks brought by multitenancy outlined in this work. They should use or develop artifacts that bring full isolation among components, blocking access to external references. Also, it must be possible to stop non-trusted threads without aecting the platform, and mechanisms that allow to implements resource sharing policies should be available.
